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Abstract:
In some usages “diaspora” refers to a social process (relocation or mi-
gration) and in others to a social entity (a migrant group or ethnic 
group). Both approaches require scholars to define diaspora, but the 
criteria often seem arbitrary. Rather than posing a timeless question 
(“What is a diaspora?”), this article examines diaspora as an idea 
that people use to interpret the world migration creates. Diaspora in 
this sense reached its peak historical significance for Ireland in two 
distinct periods, but for quite different reasons: the era of the Great 
Famine, when mass emigration gave rise to a powerful transnational 
sense of exile; and the era since the 1980s, when changes in the acad-
emy, popular culture, communications, and especially government 
policy produced a new sense of connectedness among the global Irish.
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1. The idea of diaspora 
About 10 million Irish men, women, and children have emigrated from 
Ireland since 1700. Remarkably, this figure is more than twice the popula-
tion of the Republic of Ireland today (4.8 million), it exceeds the population 
of the island of Ireland (6.7 million), and it is higher than the population of 
Ireland at its historical peak (8.5 million) on the eve of the Great Famine in 
1845. As many as 70 million people worldwide claim Irish descent, about 
half of them in the United States (Hout, Goldstein 1994; Ireland Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade [hereafter DFA], 2015, 10). Most people 
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who have grown up in Ireland since the Famine have known that, by early 
adulthood, they would have to grapple with the decision of whether to stay 
or leave. The decision is part of the Irish life cycle. How are we to explain a 
phenomenon of this scale and impact? Diaspora is perhaps the most com-
mon explanatory framework in use today.
Until quite recently, “Diaspora” – usually with an upper-case “d” – re-
ferred principally to the dispersal and exile of the Jews. Over the course of 
the twentieth century, the term expanded to cover the involuntary dispersal 
of other populations. Although mass emigration has long been one of the 
defining themes of Irish history, “diaspora” was rarely used in Irish academic 
circles before 1990, and scarcely at all in popular culture. It has since become 
the term of choice in the Irish case. The popularity of diaspora in Ireland is 
generally dated to the presidency of Mary Robinson, who lit a symbolic can-
dle in the window of her official residence, Áras an Uachtaráin, to recognise 
all people of Irish descent around the world as being in some sense part of 
the Irish nation, a gesture that embraced everyone from the most recent wave 
of emigrants to the descendants of those who had left in the distant past. 
During the “Celtic Tiger” (1995–2007), a period of extraordinary (if in 
the end unsustainable) economic growth fuelled by American investment, 
EU funding, and speculation in the construction sector, Mary Robinson’s 
call for cooperative projects between the Irish at home and abroad paid off in 
numerous ways. Many Irish emigrants returned during the boom and, for the 
first time, significant numbers of immigrants arrived from other countries. 
For only the second time since the Great Famine, the population of Ireland 
rose rather than declining due to emigration. In a speech called “Cherishing 
the Irish Diaspora” in 1995, delivered to a joint session of the Oireachtas (Ire-
land’s Parliament), Robinson noted how the “diaspora”, forged in the tragedy 
of the Famine and involuntary emigration, had become one of Ireland’s great-
est treasures – a term she clearly intended in an economic as well as a political 
and cultural sense. Significantly, when the Irish Constitution was revised in 
1998 as part of the Belfast Agreement bringing peace to Northern Ireland, a 
clause was added to Article 2 stating that “the Irish nation cherishes its special 
affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural iden-
tity and heritage” (Bunreacht na hÉireann [Constitution of Ireland] 2018, 4).
It was in this optimistic – indeed, headily optimistic – economic, politi-
cal, and cultural context that the term “diaspora” came to occupy a central 
place in the discourse about Irish emigration. As President Robinson had 
noted, the word evoked an element of tragedy in the Irish case (as it often 
does). But the Celtic Tiger roared triumph rather than tragedy, with the term 
“diaspora” celebrating the new global Irish family rather than lamenting the 
circumstances of its creation. “Diaspora” always has multiple possible mean-
ings, some of them contradictory, and recent Irish usage is no exception. It 
will be good at the outset, therefore, to consider some of these meanings. 
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Problems arise when the term is too rigidly defined, but also when its mean-
ing is left entirely open-ended. 
The etymology is worth dwelling on for a moment. The Greek noun di-
asporá derives from the verb diaspeirein, a compound of dia (over or through) 
and speirein (to scatter or sow). Contained within “diaspora” is the root, spr, 
which can be found today in such English words as “spore”, “sperm”, “spread”, 
“sprout”, and “disperse” as well as the Armenian word for diaspora, spurk. 
It was in Jewish history that the term assumed its most familiar form. The 
noun diasporá first appeared in the Septuagint, a Greek translation of the 
opening books of the Hebrew Bible produced by Jewish scholars in Alex-
andria around 250 BCE. In the Septuagint, diasporá connotes a condition 
of spiritual anguish accompanying God’s dispersal of those who disobeyed 
His word. As Deuteronomy 28:25 puts it: “The Lord will cause you to be 
defeated before your enemies. You will come at them from one direction but 
flee from them in seven, and you will become a thing of horror to all the 
kingdoms on earth” (New International Version). The New Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary, citing this passage, gives two related meanings for “dias-
pora” – a social process (“the dispersion of Jews among the Gentile nations”) 
and a social entity (“all those Jews who lived outside the biblical land of Is-
rael”). As an example of the latter usage, the dictionary cites the case of the 
Irish in the United States: “the Famine, the diaspora and the long hatred of 
Irish Americans for Britain” (New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993, 
s.v. “diaspora”; Kenny 2013, 2).
The semantic span of the term “diaspora” expanded dramatically after 
World War II, for reasons that were only partly connected to the history of 
migration. The number of international migrants increased significantly, such 
that the period since the war is sometimes referred to as the Age of Inter-
national Migration or the Age of Diaspora (Castles, Miller 2013). The total 
number of migrants today is certainly higher than ever before, yet the rate 
of migration – measured as a proportion of the global population – is not 
as high as it was a century ago. A combination of other forces contributed 
to the rise and current ubiquity of “diaspora”. The dismantling of European 
empires inspired new forms of transnational solidarity, for example among 
people of African descent in the Caribbean, France, England, and the Unit-
ed States. Decolonisation also forced certain communities to remigrate, for 
example South Asians in East Africa and Chinese in various parts of Asia. 
Involuntary migration achieved greater international prominence through 
the UN’s definition and protection of refugees. New forms of technology 
and communication facilitated faster, more efficient migration. And national 
governments began to devise inventive ways to connect with their overseas 
populations in search of economic and political support (Kenny 2013, 9). 
In this context, “diaspora” came to be applied retroactively to groups 
other than the ancient Jews whose dispersal had been notably involuntary – 
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including Armenians, people of African descent, and the Irish. Then, start-
ing in the 1980s, the term began to proliferate to an extraordinary extent 
in both academic and popular usage, to cover migration and displacement 
of all kinds. With the proliferation of usage, inevitably, came a decline in 
coherence. Diaspora is often used today as a synonym for international mi-
gration. But if every migration is diasporic, what does the term “diaspora” 
signify? If migration and diaspora mean the same thing, is there any reason 
to use the latter term other than for purposes of stylistic variation? How does 
migration history look different if diaspora is used as category of analysis? 
The sociologist Rogers Brubaker (2005) nicely captured the problem in an 
article called “The Diaspora Diaspora”, in which he demonstrated how the 
concept had acquired so many meanings that it was in danger of signifying 
nothing in particular. 
Ironically, much of the confusion about the term “diaspora” stems from 
the quest to impose a single, fixed definition (Kenny 2013, 11; Kenny 2003a, 
141-142). Scholars have produced a variety of typologies for this purpose. One 
group has proposed frameworks so comprehensive that almost every form 
of migration counts – not just the catastrophic cases but also the migration 
of merchants, workers, and colonisers (e.g., Cohen 1997). A second group, 
finding this approach too broad to be useful, has tried to establish fixed cri-
teria to pin down what diaspora is and is not, with a given group qualifying 
(or failing to qualify) as diasporic depending on how many of the criteria it 
meets (e.g., Safran 1991, 83-84). But who gets to decide on the criteria? The 
lists often seem arbitrary, and because they include different orders of experi-
ence – the nature of emigration, for example, as distinct from the experience 
of alienation abroad – consistent comparison across migrant groups becomes 
impossible (Kenny 2013, 11-12). With these concerns in mind, a third group 
of scholars, mostly literary and cultural critics, has tried to determine not 
what “diaspora” is but what it does, in other words how the term produces 
meaning in systems of discourse (e.g., Clifford 1994). Who uses “diaspora”, 
under what circumstances, and to what effect? 
Building on the third approach, this article sees diaspora neither as a 
process nor as a social entity, as the dictionary definition suggests, but as an 
idea. Instead of seeking a definitive answer to a timeless and static question 
– “What is a diaspora?” – historians can examine evidence to determine how 
and why people use the idea of diaspora in specific times and places. People 
of many different kinds – migrants, but also scholars, journalists, and policy 
makers – use this idea to interpret the world that migration creates. Viewed 
in this way, diaspora is simultaneously a category of analysis and a category 
of practice, and it carries different meanings depending on who is using the 
term and for what purpose. As an idea, diaspora has three overlapping ele-
ments: relocation, connectivity, and return. This formulation, it should be em-
phasised, is not intended to smuggle in a typology through the back door. It 
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is simply that whenever people use the idea of diaspora, they always have one 
or more of these three elements in mind. All three elements do not have to 
be present at once, and people do not necessarily need to use the word “dias-
pora” to think about migration within the conceptual framework described 
here (Kenny 2013, 13-15).
The first element, relocation, refers strictly to the process of departure, 
regardless of the subsequent history of settlement abroad. For the most part, 
diaspora is used to describe population movements that are catastrophic in 
origin or involuntary in character – the Babylonian captivity, African transat-
lantic slavery, the Irish Famine exodus – even if, in recent years, the term has 
increasingly been deployed to describe migration in general. Irish emigrants in 
the Famine era had an understandable and well documented tendency to see 
their departure as involuntary exile, making diaspora in its more traditional 
meaning an appropriate explanatory framework. Historians can acknowledge 
and interrogate the diasporic claims of Irish emigrants in various periods, 
examining how they used diaspora as a category of practice. But historians 
can also use diaspora as an analytical category in order to distinguish be-
tween different kinds of departure in different periods (Kenny 2013, 16-39).
The second element, connectivity, stands independent of the first. In oth-
er words, regardless of the form of migration, emigrants and their descend-
ants can and do build diasporic connections abroad. When the members of 
an emigrant community in a given country of settlement involve themselves 
economically, politically, or culturally in the affairs of their “homeland”, they 
may or may not begin to see themselves as a diaspora. This form of interac-
tion, after all, is very common. A less common, but more interesting, form 
of connectivity involves communication not only between a single overseas 
location and the “homeland” but within a web of globally scattered com-
munities – for example, modern Chinatowns – connected in a multipolar 
rather than a unilinear form. These interrelated global communities can be 
seen as nodes within a network, in which the “homeland” forms an essen-
tial but not necessarily central location. When connectivity is understood 
in this way, diaspora provides a powerful framework for understanding mi-
gration history. Irish nationalists in nineteenth-century New York, Toronto, 
and Sydney, for example, engaged in a self-consciously transnational con-
versation about the liberation of Ireland and the creation of an Irish nation. 
For the hardline, physical force republican tradition of Irish nationalism in 
particular, New York City rivalled and at times surpassed Dublin in gener-
ating leaders, ideas, and money (Kenny 2013, 40-60). 
The third and final element of the idea of diaspora is return (60-86). 
Every conception of diaspora features a homeland, whether real or imagined. 
Return can be literal, as in the Zionist movement; more often it is metaphori-
cal, spiritual, or political, but no less potent for that. People of African de-
scent in the Americas who longed to go “back to Africa” in the nineteenth 
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and twentieth centuries knew that, for the most part, they had no place to 
go to and could not have afforded to return even if there was such a place. 
But this very impossibility, far from rendering their longing to return irrel-
evant, made it all the more poignant and powerful as a source of solidarity. 
Irish Americans at the turn of the twentieth century had some of the lowest 
rates of return from the United States, comparable to those of Jewish Amer-
icans. Even when finances were not an obstacle, there was little to go back 
to in an Ireland whose dismal economic performance compelled more than 
two million Irish people to emigrate over the remainder of the century, most 
of them to Britain. In the absence of large-scale return, Irish communities 
abroad were sustained by a powerful sense of exile. The exile motif originat-
ed partly in the pre-migration culture of rural Ireland (Miller, Boling, Doyle 
1980; Miller 1985), but it was also the product of bitterness and alienation 
stemming from the Great Famine – the gravest catastrophe in Irish history 
and the central event in the country’s emigration history.
2. The Famine generation
In the standard scholarly works on diaspora, the Irish are the European 
emigrant group most likely to be included, typically by virtue of the Great 
Famine and the emigration it unleashed (Cohen 1997; Chaliand 1997). A 
strong case can be made for the utility of diaspora as an explanatory frame-
work for this massive wave of emigration. It was triggered by a catastrophic 
event. It featured considerable involuntary relocation. The emigrants dispersed 
to several destinations at once. And they nurtured a strong sense of banish-
ment and exile overseas. That said, one needs to be careful not to collapse 
the entirety of Irish emigration history into a template set by the uniquely 
traumatic events of the Famine generation. Most emigrants who left Ireland 
before and after the Famine – and some who left during the crisis – did so for 
conventional economic reasons, in search of work and opportunity abroad, 
the same fundamental reasons that have been at the heart of most mass emi-
grations throughout history. For the Famine emigration in particular, how-
ever, a diasporic framework has considerable explanatory power.
Between 1846 and 1855 – the period that historians refer to as the “Fam-
ine decade” – Ireland’s population was reduced by one-third, an event without 
parallel in European history. Over 1 million people died of starvation and 
famine-related diseases and about 2.1 million emigrated, more than in the 
previous two centuries combined. About 1.5 million of the emigrants went 
to the United States, just over 300,000 to British North America (many of 
whom then trekked overland to the United States), roughly the same num-
ber to Britain, and tens of thousands to Australia and New Zealand. These 
2.1 million emigrants represented one-quarter of Ireland’s population on the 
eve of the Famine and accounted for the largest European mass emigration, 
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in proportional terms, in the nineteenth century. The Irish were the single 
largest immigrant group in the United States in the 1840s, accounting for 
45 per cent of the total flow. In the 1850s they and the Germans each made 
up about 35 per cent of the immigrants. By 1860, one in every four residents 
of New York, Boston, Liverpool, and Glasgow were Irish-born. The Famine 
also set in motion the massive wave of emigration from 1856 to 1921, when 
another 4.5 million emigrants left the country (Kenny 2018, 666, 669).
The Famine emigration was the foundational moment in the formation 
of Irish communities abroad – especially in the United States, where the 
emigrants asked hard questions about British relief policies. Did crop fail-
ure necessarily have to lead to starvation and mass emigration? When the 
potato failed, why was no adequate source of food provided as a substitute? 
The British government experimented with various temporary measures, sell-
ing corn meal at cost price, providing indoor relief in workhouses and out-
door relief via public works projects, and even briefly distributing food free 
of charge via soup kitchens. In 1847, however, these centralised efforts were 
abruptly abandoned in favour of local responsibility and chargeability. “There 
is only one way in which the relief of the destitute ever has been, or ever will 
be, conducted consistently with the general welfare, and that is by making 
it a local charge”, wrote Charles Trevelyan, the British official in charge of 
Famine relief in Dublin (quoted in Gray 1995, 153; emphasis in original). 
The Poor Law Extension Act of 1847 placed the burden of relief on local 
taxes, with landlords and commercial farmers supposed to support the new 
system. The results were catastrophic: as tenants could no longer pay their 
rents, their landlords could not pay the taxes and, rather than subsidising 
the poor, they had every incentive to evict them, sometimes with packages of 
assisted compulsory emigration (Gray 1995, 64-73; Ó Gráda 2000, 49-52). 
The moderate Irish nationalist leader and member of the British parliament, 
Isaac Butt, objected that Irish starvation was an imperial rather than a local 
problem. There was “no such thing as an English treasury”, he pointed out, 
merely “the exchequer of the United Kingdom”. Converting Famine relief 
from a central to a local responsibility, Butt concluded, made the Union “a 
mockery” (quoted in Gray 1995, 157).
It was the Irish in the United States who voiced the most stringent criti-
cisms of British policy. From his American exile in 1861, the Irish revolution-
ary John Mitchel wrote that “a million and a half of men, women and children 
were carefully, prudently, and peacefully slain by the English government” 
(Gray 1995, 179). Potatoes had failed all over Europe, yet there was Famine 
only in Ireland. “The almighty, indeed, sent the potato blight”, Mitchel noto-
riously concluded, “but the English created the Famine” (178). Most histori-
ans, especially those based in universities, have disagreed with this verdict on 
the grounds that genocide involves deliberate intent to exterminate (Ó Gráda 
2000, 10). Nonetheless, as Gray (1995, 82, 152-154; 1999, 227-283, 328-338) 
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has demonstrated, many high-ranking officials and members of the British 
establishment embraced providentialist and laissez-faire thinking in their ea-
gerness to let history take its course unhindered by government intervention. 
And more recent historians have raised the case for genocide, understood in 
a historically specific sense: not “the deliberate, systematic annihilation of 
an entire ethnic group or religious group by mass murder” as defined by the 
post-Holocaust U.N. Convention of 1948, but “the deliberate, systematic 
use of an environmental catastrophe to destroy a people under the pretext 
of engineering social reform” (Ó Murchadha 2011, 196-197; MacSuibhne 
2013, 9-12). When confronted with the horror of Famine, a natural reaction 
is to recoil and treat it as an undifferentiated whole. But any judgement on 
the Irish catastrophe requires the historian to enter into the internal history 
of the crisis, to understand how it changed over time, and to evaluate the 
policy decisions that were taken and not taken. Regardless of what conclu-
sions emerge from this analysis, it is undeniable that Mitchel’s words mobi-
lised Irish emigrants and their descendants around the world, especially in 
the United States. Historians therefore need to take these words seriously, 
even if they disagree with them analytically. The idea that the British created 
the Famine contributed to a powerful sense of exile among the Irish abroad, 
lending a strongly anti-imperialist dimension to their diasporic nationalism.
Partly as a result, the overseas Irish were unusually active in the politi-
cal affairs of their homeland. From the Famine generation onward, Irish 
immigrants and their descendants in Britain, North America, and Australia 
were deeply involved in the two major types of Irish nationalism: moderate, 
non-violent constitutionalism and physical force republicanism. Within the 
various countries of settlement, support for different types of Irish national-
ism varied by class, gender, and recency of arrival. There was also significant 
variation between these countries: republican and anti-imperial national-
ism found a natural home in the United States; moderate constitutionalism 
was stronger in the British imperial settings of Australia, New Zealand, and 
Canada. Leading Irish political figures such as Charles Stewart Parnell and 
Michael Davitt made extensive tours of the United States in the 1880s, build-
ing support for Irish nationalism among the communities established by the 
Famine generation. The American Irish orchestrated the escape of Irish po-
litical prisoners from Australia to the United States and sent money, arms, 
and munitions to support insurrections in Ireland. Irish revolutionaries and 
journalists in New York City, Boston, Chicago, London, Sydney, and Dub-
lin engaged in an explicitly transnational exchange of ideas about the best 
strategies for securing Ireland’s independence (Brown 1966; Brundage 2016).
In an apparent paradox, diasporic nationalism of this kind could serve 
as a powerful force for assimilation rather than accentuating the alienation 
of the Irish overseas. The origins of Irish-American nationalism, as Brown 
(1966) demonstrated in a still-influential thesis, often lay not so much in di-
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rect concerns about Ireland as in a desire to improve the standing of the Irish 
in their new communities abroad. Irish-American nationalists fought for Irish 
freedom, to be sure, but in doing so they were hoping to win acceptance and 
respectability in their adopted country. An independent Ireland, they be-
lieved, would raise their status internationally, and the very act of political 
mobilisation would demonstrate their fitness for citizenship in a participa-
tory democracy. This argument, it must be said, fits moderate constitutional 
nationalism better than the physical force tradition, given that engagement 
in political violence was an unlikely path to respectability. And, as Foner 
(1980) pointed out, most Irish Americans during and after the Famine were 
members of the working class, forging an oppositional culture of their own 
rather than simply aspiring to middle-class status. Yet their radical brand of 
nationalism too was directed mainly toward American ends. The trope of 
exile at the heart of Irish diasporic nationalism, in short, was never simply a 
matter of lamentation or homesickness; it could also be a powerful force for 
communal cohesion, political mobilisation, and social advancement in the 
host communities. 
It is important to reiterate, in conclusion, that the Famine generation 
was only one episode in the long history of Irish emigration. Two million 
emigrants left the country in the Famine decade, but the history of Irish 
emigration stretched over three centuries from 1700 to the present. At least 
1.5 million emigrants left Ireland in the 150-year period before the Famine, 
and as many as 6.5 million in the 150 years after the catastrophe. Impos-
ing a single, undifferentiated concept of “diaspora” on the entirety of Irish 
emigration history can reduce that history to a morality tale based on the 
unique trauma of the 1840s (Kenny 2013, 32). One of the biggest pitfalls of 
diaspora is homogenisation. The concept, as Patterson and Kelley (2000, 20) 
remarked, has a strong tendency to conceal “differences and discontinuities” 
and to erase “complexities and contradictions as it seeks to fit all within the 
metaphor”. The history of Irish emigration consisted of five distinct waves – 
the eighteenth century, the pre-Famine era, the Famine era, the post-Famine 
era, and the twentieth century and beyond – that varied considerably in their 
causes, regional origins, and destinations as well as by class, gender, and re-
ligious composition.  To collapse these separate phases into a single type is 
to rob history of its diversity and diminish its protagonists. 
Diaspora has an even stronger tendency to homogenise emigrants once 
they have settled overseas. Viewed from this perspective, the Irish (like many 
other migrant groups) become a single global people, ignoring divisions of 
class, gender, and regional origin as well as the considerable differences be-
tween the countries where they settled. A single point of geographical origin, 
in other words, produces an ostensibly unitary people abroad, regardless of 
local circumstances or social differentiation. To offset this tendency, it is use-
ful to adopt a comparative perspective alongside a transnational approach, 
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analysing the differences and the similarities in emigration patterns over time, 
and between the countries and regions of settlement, and not just the ex-
change of people and ideas between these places (Kenny 2013). By the same 
token, just as patterns of emigration differ from one period to the next, the 
relative weight of the three constituent elements of the idea of diaspora can 
be expected to shift accordingly. 
The remainder of this essay will examine precisely this kind of shift. If 
relocation was the dominant element in the Irish idea of diaspora during the 
Famine era, the dominant element in the contemporary era is connectivity. 
This is not to say that either element was absent in the other period, merely 
that their relative importance changed over time. The massive relocation of 
the mid-nineteenth century gave rise to new communities overseas, which 
built connections back to Ireland and, eventually, among themselves. Con-
nectivity was important in this era, in other words, even if relocation was 
fundamental. By the same token, emigrants continue to leave Ireland in size-
able numbers today – mostly for Britain and Australia rather than the United 
States – even as Ireland and the overseas communities are tied together in 
a complex global network by forms of connectivity that do not involve mi-
gration. Technology and communications are one important dimension of 
this network. But perhaps the most significant development in recent years 
is that national governments have emerged as major players in the diasporic 
arena, forging powerful new connections with their overseas communities. 
The Irish government in particular has launched a sophisticated and success-
ful campaign to connect with its “diaspora”.
3. The contemporary era
For many social scientists, the term “contemporary era” might refer to 
the current decade, but for historians it is likely to cover a longer time span. 
The contemporary era of immigration history in the United States, for ex-
ample, refers to the period since the reforms of 1965, which abolished the 
national origins quota system and ushered in a genuinely global phase of 
immigration. For the purposes of this article, the “contemporary era” refers 
to the period since the 1980s, when diaspora assumed its current popularity 
in academic and popular discourse about Irish emigration. This period, in 
turn, contains two distinct and slightly overlapping phases: from the 1980s 
through 1998, when associational life among the overseas Irish, especially 
in the United States, derived much of its vitality from engagement with the 
political conflict in Northern Ireland; and from 1995 to the present, when 
the promise of the “Celtic Tiger” gave way to severe economic recession, re-
newed emigration, and a profound national crisis. The emphasis of the Irish 
government’s “diaspora engagement” shifted accordingly, from high-level 
political and diplomatic cooperation during the peace process, to confident 
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cultural assertion at the height of the economic boom, to hard-headed out-
reach efforts after the crash. 
It is worth considering at the outset that there are ways of thinking about 
ethnicity and diaspora other than through the popular but elusive category 
of “identity”. The sociologist Dan Lainer-Vos (2012, 2013), for example, ex-
amines the formation and functioning of ethnic and diasporic groups – and 
nations – as a practical matter, involving governments, institutions, and asso-
ciations. For Lainer-Vos, putting together and maintaining affiliative groups 
of this sort involves a set of concrete problems to be solved rather than (or 
in addition to) a community to be created in the abstract. These groups, he 
argues, are “stitched together” rather than “imagined” (the seductive but 
elusive term favoured in much of the humanities). Lainer-Vos concentrates 
on financial transactions, for example bond drives, in his analysis of how di-
asporic communities work. 
Ted Smyth (2018), in a compelling analysis of the retention and trans-
formation of Irish-American ethnicity over time, adopts a similar approach, 
revealing a strikingly broad and powerful array of Irish cultural, academic, 
and political institutions in the United States in the 1980s. Among the most 
prominent of these were ethnic newspapers, county associations (based on 
place of origin in Ireland), the Gaelic Athletic Association, Comhaltas Ceoltói-
rí Eireann (which promoted Irish traditional music and dance), the Friendly 
Sons of St. Patrick, the Ancient Order of Hibernians, the American Confer-
ence of Irish Studies, and the Irish American Cultural Institute. Political-
ly, the “Four Horsemen” of Irish America – Thomas P. O’Neill (Speaker of 
the U.S. House of Representatives), Senators Edward Kennedy and Patrick 
Moynihan, and Governor Hugh Carey of New York – emerged as powerful 
supporters of moderate constitutionalism, working closely with John Hume 
in Northern Ireland and exerting considerable influence over American 
policy. Noraid (Northern Irish Aid), on the other hand, supported physical 
force republicanism, serving as the U.S. fundraising agent of Sinn Féin and 
the IRA. Overall, Smyth concludes, Irish-American associational life in the 
1980s was so robust largely because of its engagement with the political con-
flict in Northern Ireland. 
By the late 1990s, at the height of the “Celtic Tiger” and with the worst 
of the conflict in Northern Ireland at an end, Irish cultural self-confidence 
was at an all-time high. Most of the organisations Smyth discusses were thriv-
ing, along with many more. Riverdance, which was first performed in 1994, 
brought unprecedented attention to Irish dance and music. In the academic 
world, important new centres of research and study were joined in a network 
of conferences, journals, student and faculty exchanges and, above all, by the 
Internet. The critical electronic forum at this time was the Irish Diaspora 
list, moderated by Patrick O’Sullivan, the director of the Irish Diaspora Re-
search Unit at the University of Bradford. O’Sullivan edited a six-volume se-
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ries of essays called The Irish Worldwide (O’Sullivan 1993-1997), doing more 
than any other individual to help create the emerging field of Irish Diaspora 
Studies. By the year 2000, the United States had nine Irish Studies centres 
or programmes, Britain had five, Canada and Australia had three each, and 
Brazil had one. Most of these centres and programmes dealt with themes of 
migration and diaspora as part of their conception of Irish Studies, and at 
least six in Ireland were devoted specifically to this theme (Kenny 2003b).
Then, in 2008, disaster struck. With the collapse of the “Celtic Tiger”, Ireland 
suddenly and brutally became a nation of emigrants once again. From 2008 to 
2014, over 240,000 people left the country (DFA 2015, 14). The Irish government 
was already closely involved with diaspora affairs. A report by the Task Force on 
Policy Regarding Emigrants, an independent advisory group established by the 
government led to the establishment of the Irish Abroad Unit and the Emigrant 
Support Programme within the Department of Foreign Affairs in 2004 (13). At 
this point, the primary focus was on aging Irish immigrants in Britain, most of 
whom had left Ireland in the 1950s. The government’s engagement with diaspo-
ra affairs rose significantly after the economy collapsed. In 2009 and 2010, the 
Global Irish Economic Forum and the Global Irish Network were established 
“to provide mechanisms for some of the most successful Irish overseas Irish to 
connect with Ireland and identify ways to contribute to Ireland’s continued re-
covery and economic development” (14). The government declared that 2013 
would be the “Year of the Gathering”, an opportunity for all people of Irish ori-
gin (or inclination) to contribute to the country’s cultural and economic recov-
ery (Glucksman Ireland House Podcast 2017). This announcement was greeted 
with considerable cynicism in some quarters, with the Irish actor Gabriel Byrne, 
who had been named Ireland’s first “cultural ambassador to the United States” 
in 2010, denouncing The Gathering as a “scam” and a “shakedown” (Irish Times, 
10 November 2012). What would have been really surprising, however, was if 
the Irish government had not engaged in efforts of this kind, especially during 
so grave a crisis, given the size and resources of the overseas Irish population. 
Governments around the world were busily engaged in similar efforts. 
In 1998, Armenia declared that it would strengthen links with its diaspora 
(spurk) through a special department within the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs. The first Armenia-Diaspora conference met in Yerevan in 1999, and 
five more were held by 2017. The Armenian Constitution was amended in 
2008 to introduce a form of dual citizenship, including voting rights, for 
qualified people of Armenian descent abroad. The Chinese government, al-
though it does not permit dual citizenship, encourages economic, scientific, 
and cultural cooperation among the global Chinese via the Overseas Chi-
nese Affairs Office (OCAO). The Indian government, which also prohibits 
dual citizenship, has offered a variety of incentives to attract investment by 
overseas Indians. The African Union, meanwhile, declared the African Di-
aspora its sixth region in 2003. 
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In March 2015, the Irish government released a major report, Global 
Irish: Ireland’s Diaspora Policy. Throughout the report, the government used 
“diaspora” in the familiar sense of a social entity – Irish and Irish-descended 
people living abroad. But in deploying the idea of diaspora the government 
was also constituting the meaning of the term. As the “first clear statement 
of Government of Ireland policy on the diaspora”, the report began by an-
nouncing its vision of “a vibrant, diverse global Irish community, connect-
ed to Ireland and to each other” (DFA 2015, 2). On this basis, Global Irish 
outlined a comprehensive and imaginative set of proposals and guidelines. 
Ireland, the report noted, had long been recognised as “a leader in diaspora 
engagement” (10) and this expertise showed through on every page of the 
report. In his Foreword, the Taoiseach (head of government), Enda Kenny, 
T.D., laid out the rationale for the new policy:
The voice of this small nation is hugely amplified by the many millions around 
the globe who are Irish by birth or by descent or by affiliation. Our diaspora are 
[sic] an important part of our story as a nation. They are part of who we are as a 
people, what we have done and where we have gone in this world. Their existence 
is the end result of a long history of emigration which for many was not considered 
a matter of choice. (6)
It was in this context that Kenny announced the creation of Ireland’s Min-
istry for Diaspora Affairs, with Jimmy Deenihan T.D. as its head (DFA 2015, 
6). Deenihan, in his own Foreword to Global Irish, noted that the new Ministry 
spanned the Department of the Taoiseach and the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, and he announced that he would chair an Interdepartmental Com-
mittee to ensure “a whole of government approach towards diaspora issues” (9). 
The government was forthright about the economic crisis that had trig-
gered its new policy. At the end of the twentieth century, the Taoiseach not-
ed, the Irish people had thought the days of mass emigration were behind 
them, but “the economic crash of 2008 once again deprived our people, and 
particularly our young people, of the jobs and opportunities at home that 
they deserve” (6). As the Tánaiste (deputy head of government), Joan Burton, 
T.D., noted in her Foreword:
The size of our diaspora gives us a reach and a voice throughout the world that 
is the envy of many other nations. We have been very fortunate to be able to draw 
upon their experience and expertise in overcoming our recent economic difficulties 
and getting this country back on its feet and creating jobs. […] As we strengthen 
our economic recovery we look forward to continuing to work with the diaspora to 
ensure that Ireland’s future is secured for all of our people. (7)
Burton concluded optimistically: “The cranes are on the skyline again, 
the jobs are emerging again. A generation stands ready to come home to a 
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Republic of equality, of opportunity, of hopes and dreams and possibilities” 
(ibidem). 
Global Irish took seriously the government’s commitment, indeed ob-
ligation, under the constitutional amendment of 1998 to connect with and 
support the overseas Irish. As the introduction to the document put it:
The Irish have an affinity to and with each other that is not bound nor de-
fined by geography or time. This first ever comprehensive statement of Ireland’s 
diaspora policy is firmly rooted in Article 2 of the Constitution of Ireland which 
states that ‘the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish an-
cestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage’. There can be no 
more clear-cut statement of the importance of the relationship between Ireland 
and our diaspora. (10)
Successive generations of the Irish overseas had “given Ireland a repu-
tation and reach that other nations envy”, the report noted, but emigration 
continued to be perceived as a loss to Ireland, especially “a loss of young peo-
ple, with their energy, innovation and capacity to drive change” (ibidem). 
While many emigrants found opportunity abroad, others suffered hardship 
and needed support. 
The government would come to the assistance of these needy emi-
grants, just as it called on the more prosperous members of the “diaspora” 
to assist Ireland in a time of great need. “Irish people all over the world”, as 
Charles Flanagan, T.D., the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, noted, 
“have played their part in Ireland’s recovery in recent years, and in restoring 
Ireland’s reputation and place in the world after a period of unprecedented 
economic challenges”. Those who wanted to give back to Ireland had done 
so in a myriad of ways – through the Global Irish Network and the Global 
Irish Economic Forum, by encouraging friends to visit Ireland, by setting up 
businesses, and by introducing people abroad to the richness of Irish culture. 
“Our diaspora is both an asset and a responsibility”, Flanagan concluded. 
“For some the journey has been hugely positive while for others emigration 
has been a cause of pain and heartache” (DFA 2015, 8). This phrase, “an as-
set and a responsibility” nicely captured the report’s reciprocal conception of 
diaspora. The government had a responsibility to the overseas Irish; but, as 
members of the extended Irish nation, they too had a responsibility to help 
Ireland when they could. 
While a few governments – notably Mexico’s and Italy’s – have formal-
ised such quid pro quo arrangements by extending voting rights to their citi-
zens abroad, Global Irish was circumspect on this matter. “The issue of voting 
rights in Irish elections is of enormous importance to many Irish citizens 
abroad”, the report acknowledged. “They have expressed this through well 
organised and vocal campaigns and in submissions to this review of policy” 
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(19). The government conceded that allowing Irish citizens abroad to vote in 
certain elections – for example, for President of Ireland – would “allow them 
to deepen their engagement with Ireland and to play a more active role in Irish 
society. It would further the wider goal of enhancing diaspora engagement” 
(ibidem). But implementing and managing such a policy would be challeng-
ing, Global Irish warned, and it would raise questions about the extent to 
which voting rights might be extended in cases where citizenship was passed 
down through the generations, “including to those who have never visited 
or engaged with Ireland”. Rather than proposing action, the report recom-
mended that various ministries analyse the policy, legal, and practical issues 
and report back to the government (ibidem). In the meantime, Ireland’s di-
aspora engagement would be based on a five-part policy based on the guid-
ing principle of connectivity.
4. A five-part policy for the Irish diaspora
The five-part policy proposed by Global Irish exemplifies the range and 
power of government outreach efforts in the contemporary era. The policy 
was designed as one that:
Supports: those who have left Ireland and need or want support;
Connects: in an inclusive way with those, of all ages, around the world who are 
Irish, of Irish descent or have a tangible connection to Ireland, and wish to main-
tain a connection with Ireland and with each other;
Facilitates: a wide range of activity at local, national and international level de-
signed to build on and develop twoway diaspora engagement;
Recognises: the wide variety of people who make up our diaspora and the im-
portant ongoing contribution that they have made, both individually and collec-
tively, in shaping our development and our identity;
Evolves: to meet changing needs in changing times. (DFA 2015, 4)
Under the first heading, “Supporting the Diaspora”, the Irish govern-
ment committed to provide multiannual grants under the Emigrant Support 
Programme, keep welfare at the heart of its approach to diaspora issues, and 
increase its focus on the mental health of emigrants (4, 26-29). “While many 
of our emigrants are better equipped than before for the demands of emigra-
tion”, the report noted, “there are still those who remain vulnerable and for 
whom emigration is a challenging experience” (25). The government recog-
nised the needs both of departing and returning emigrants and of people of 
Irish descent around the world. In 2014, it had provided financial support 
to 210 organisations working with emigrants and the Irish diaspora in more 
than twenty countries across five continents (ibidem).
The Emigrant Support Programme (ESP), managed by the Irish Abroad 
Unit in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in partnership with Ire-
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land’s embassies and consulates abroad, was the key to this first component of 
the policy. As “a tangible expression of the Government’s support of, commit-
ment to, and interest in the global Irish community” (ibidem), the ESP assisted 
over 470 organisations in more than 30 countries in the period 2004-2014. 
Grants totalled over €126 million, ranging from very small amounts for grass-
roots community and voluntary groups to large allocations for non-profit or-
ganisations (ibidem). The ESP, Global Irish promised, would continue to fund 
projects that celebrated, maintained, and strengthened links between Ireland 
and the global Irish, and addressed the needs of vulnerable emigrants, includ-
ing Travellers, the undocumented, the elderly, prisoners and former prisoners, 
and those suffering from mental illness, alcoholism, or psychological distress. 
It would also fund projects that furthered the work of the Global Irish Eco-
nomic Forum, supported business networks in their efforts to connect Irish 
people at home and abroad, and improved awareness and understanding of 
diaspora issues through research (25, 28-29).
Under the second heading, “Connecting with the Diaspora”, Global Irish 
addressed the central element of the idea of diaspora in the contemporary 
era. “One of the main themes running through this Policy is that of connec-
tivity”, Minister Flanagan wrote. “Our network of embassies and consulates 
around the world will continue their outreach to the diaspora engaging with 
Irish communities” (8; emphasis added). The Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade would build on that outreach “by availing of the opportunities 
presented by fast evolving technology which, in recent years, has transformed 
the ability to stay in touch and to remain connected” (ibidem). Global Irish 
placed a strong emphasis on improving “communications and connectivity 
between Ireland and its diaspora”. As the report put it:
Effective communication is essential to real diaspora engagement. With mod-
ern technologies, it is more important and more possible than ever to engage with 
Irish communities globally. The need to communicate better with the Irish abroad 
was one of the strongest themes to emerge from the public consultation on dias-
pora policy. People want to feel connected and they want the Government to play 
a role in achieving this. (34)
The report noted that since the establishment of the Irish Abroad Unit in 
2004, communications had evolved significantly: “Current means of mobile 
communications and widely available social media were in their infancy at that 
time – Facebook was set up in the same year as the Irish Abroad Unit, Skype 
was established just a year earlier, and other networks and tools, such as Twit-
ter did not yet exist” (11). Social media would play an important role in the 
new policy, but also more traditional forms of communication such as letters, 
telephone, and email. As the report put it, “We want to communicate with the 
Irish abroad in the ways they choose to communicate with each other” (35). 
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To facilitate better communication, Flanagan announced the creation 
of the Global Irish Hub (<https://www.dfa.ie/global-irish/>). Run by the De-
partment of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Hub would “provide a portal for 
the diaspora – a single place to find information on support services, Irish 
heritage, staying in touch, business and education, finding Irish networks 
in other countries and information on returning to Ireland” (DFA 2015, 8). 
Flanagan encouraged people abroad who were born in Ireland or of Irish de-
scent to register on the Hub and to subscribe to the new Global Irish News-
letter (<https://www.dfa.ie/global-irish/staying-in-touch/newsletter/>), which 
would issue regular communications by email to the overseas Irish, along 
with a weekly eNewsletter with the latest news and job announcements. Ef-
forts would also be made to enhance access to Irish television and radio sta-
tions and to support media coverage of diaspora issues at home and abroad 
(DFA 2015, 35). 
Among the cultural arenas identified by Global Irish for particular at-
tention and development were genealogy, arts, culture, music, language, and 
historical commemorations. “The desire to trace family history”, the report 
noted, “is often the incentive for an individual of Irish ancestry to activate 
their links to Ireland” (33). Here, once again, was a corrective to cynicism: 
whereas the figure of the “returning Yank” in search of his or her roots is 
sometimes ridiculed in Ireland, the government respected the search for ori-
gins and saw opportunities to make further connections. Arts, culture, and 
music, meanwhile, were the source of deeper and more extensive links. “More 
than any other aspect of Ireland or our Irishness, our culture reaches all cor-
ners of the world”, the report noted. “It is one of the most effective ways of 
connecting with the global Irish diaspora, strengthening links to home and 
maintaining expression of Irish identity through generations” (36). “Culture 
Ireland”, a division of the Department of Arts, Heritage, Regional, Rural 
and Gaeltacht Affairs, would continue to support Irish arts, film, and music 
worldwide, helping to generate new audiences among the global Irish and 
beyond (ibidem). The government would also support Comhaltas Ceoltóirí 
Éireann in its promotion of traditional Irish music and dance, including class-
es, festivals, tours, published recordings, and books and tutorials (ibidem). 
Literature got only a passing nod – to Joyce, Yeats, and Beckett – perhaps 
because this form of Irish culture was already renowned around the world, 
but the report acknowledged the Irish Studies programmes at Notre Dame 
University, New York University, and Charles University, Prague as provid-
ing “a formal opportunity for the diaspora to engage with their heritage in 
an educational setting” (7). In the realm of Irish-language, the government 
would continue to fund initiatives by Glór na Gael, Comhaltas Ceoltóirí Éire-
ann, and other organisations. And, with the period 2013-2022 billed as the 
Irish “Decade of Commemorations”, the government saw an important role 
for the Irish abroad, not least because many of the leaders of the 1916 Rising 
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were born or spent part of their lives overseas. Ireland’s network of embas-
sies and consulates, the government noted, would have a central role to play 
in this regard, as would the ESP (39). 
Global Irish also announced a special initiative, Fréamhacha, aimed at 
“deepening the ties with Ireland of younger non-Irish born members of the 
Irish diaspora” (5, 38). A pilot programme, modelled on the “growing focus 
in countries with large diasporas on providing an opportunity for the children 
of emigrants to strengthen their links with the country of their parents or 
grandparents through immersive visits to their ‘home’ country” (38), would 
sponsor two-week stays by young Irish Americans (similar to the visits by 
many Jewish American teenagers to Israel). These short visits, the government 
anticipated, would be “an important tool to nurture a greater mindfulness of 
heritage in diaspora populations” (ibidem). The programme was abandoned 
after the one-year pilot, but private groups continued to organise a limited 
number of visits. Just as Irish-American cultural organisations today realise 
the importance of connecting with young people if a sense of ethnicity is to 
survive, the success of outreach efforts by national governments would seem 
to depend in part on similar initiatives.
Finally, Global Irish identified sports and St. Patrick’s Day as especially 
important in fostering diasporic connectivity. Among Irish sports, the report 
naturally singled out Gaelic games, which it claimed were being played in-
creasingly abroad (36). With approximately 400 clubs outside the island of 
Ireland, the Gaelic Athletic Association had “arguably […] greater reach in-
to the Irish diaspora than any other organisation” (42). “In many locations”, 
the report noted, “GAA clubs provide a first port of call for new emigrants, 
giving them an immediate circle of familiarity and support” (ibidem). In the 
United States, however, Gaelic games do not have a realistic chance of com-
peting with the national sports of baseball, basketball, and football, and to 
a growing extent soccer, which suggests that the government’s position was 
more patriotic than pragmatic in this case. As for St. Patrick’s Day, Global 
Irish noted that it was “celebrated in more countries around the world than 
any other national day and reflects the distinctive nature and reach of the 
Irish nation”. This day of national and international celebration offered “a 
platform for Ireland to engage with the world”, an opportunity “to commu-
nicate with the world when the world is listening” (8).
“Facilitating Diaspora Engagement” was the third component of the 
new policy. Working with the Clinton Institute at University College Dub-
lin, the government convened a Global Irish Civic Forum in Ireland in 2015 
“to discuss the challenges facing the Irish abroad and to capture the voice of 
ordinary Irish emigrants” (5, 42). This conference was followed by the Fourth 
Global Irish Economic Forum, also in 2015, in a new format emphasising 
greater engagement with organisations based in Ireland and greater partici-
pation by women and young people (5, 44). Another Irish Civic Forum met 
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in Dublin in 2017. Although Global Irish was a blueprint for policy, the re-
port emphasised that the government was “just one part of the complex web 
of networks and organisations that connect people in Ireland and across all 
continents under the single banner of being Irish” (23). Its role was “primar-
ily one of support and facilitation”. Financial support was a key part of this 
approach, but also institutional support through Ireland’s network of embas-
sies and consulates (ibidem). 
Irish business networks, the report noted, were flourishing around the 
world due to increased emigration and enhanced technology, but they had 
yet to reach their potential. These networks, the government believed, could 
be used to promote Ireland as an attractive location for business and to at-
tract investment and entrepreneurship. Yet there was no platform to bring 
Irish business networks from around the world together. The government an-
nounced that the ESP would welcome proposals to this end, especially those 
concerning “diasporic networks for female professional development” – a 
theme emphasised in a recent report by the Clinton Institute, “Supporting 
the next Generation of the Irish Diaspora”, which had identified “the emer-
gence of a young, female, professional element in the Irish emigrant com-
munities” (Kennedy, Lyes, Russell 2014; DFA 2015, 45). Philanthropy, as 
Global Irish observed was “still at an early stage” in Ireland, whereas members 
of the “diaspora” both Irish-born and of Irish descent, had given significant 
sums to Irish projects, programmes, and organisations. Alongside particu-
lar individuals, the report singled out the Ireland Funds as “as a remarkable 
example of diaspora giving”. Founded in 1976, the Funds were operating in 
twelve countries by 2015 and had raised more than $480 million for over 
3,000 organisations. The Ireland Funds’ vision of “the global Irish making a 
difference together”, the report concluded, “could serve as a guide to all those 
seeking to work for shared good in this area” (DFA 2015, 45; Smyth 2019, 5).
Global Irish placed a strong emphasis on the possibility of return to 
Ireland. “In times gone by”, the report noted, “leaving Ireland was often 
perceived as a life sentence particularly by those who were left behind. That 
is no longer the case and attitudes to emigration have changed along with 
the changing nature of emigration” (DFA 2015, 11). In its “ongoing work 
to deepen economic recovery”, the government would strive to create the 
conditions whereby those who had to leave the country for economic rea-
sons could return. The government would work to ease the logistical chal-
lenges, including recognition of qualifications acquired abroad and lack 
of affordable housing and job opportunities. The “Safe Home” emigrant 
support service (which had originally provided help in securing affordable 
housing only for older Irish-born emigrants seeking to return) would pro-
vide information and advice for anyone who was considering returning to 
Ireland, along with support for those who had done so (<https://www.safe-
homeireland.com/>).
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In a creative touch, Global Irish envisaged an important place for Ireland 
in the field of Diaspora Studies. Given the centrality of emigration to Ireland’s 
historical development, the government committed to “Support efforts to use 
Ireland as a hub for research into the potential and reach of diasporas and the 
practical application of such research” (DFA 2015, 5, 47). With more than 230 
million international migrants in the world in 2015, the report noted, Ireland 
was “ahead of most countries in efforts to engage with our citizens abroad and 
their descendants. Initiatives like the Emigrant Support Programme and the 
Global Irish Network are original and inventive and point the way for others 
to follow” (46). Learning, the report continued, is based on sharing knowl-
edge, and in this respect Ireland’s universities, non-governmental organisations, 
private individuals, and the government itself had much to give and much to 
receive. The government would “support efforts to use Ireland as a hub for re-
search into the potential and reach of diasporas and the practical application 
of such research” (ibidem).
In the fourth component of the new policy, “Recognising the Diaspo-
ra”, the report saluted the day-to-day work of Irish officials overseas in their 
efforts to connect with Irish communities and noted the high-level engage-
ment with those communities during ministerial visits. The government en-
couraged Irish people, organisations, and communities to engage with the 
nomination process for the Presidential Distinguished Service Award for the 
Irish Abroad, initiated in 2012 to recognise persons living abroad “who have 
given sustained and distinguished service” to Ireland or to Irish communi-
ties overseas (DFA 2015, 5, 49). The report also promised to reevaluate the 
ill-fated Certificate of Irish Heritage scheme (5, 50). Introduced in 2011, the 
certificates recognised the Irish identity felt by people around the world who 
were not entitled to Irish citizenship. The government honoured some high-
figures under this programme, including former U.S. President Bill Clinton, 
President Barack Obama, the actor Tom Cruise, and the Olympian Lord 
Coe, but everyone else had to buy the certificates (€40 for the piece of paper 
or €120 with a frame). Not surprisingly, only 3,000 had been sold by 2015 
and the scheme was discontinued later that year.
Finally, and importantly, Global Irish recognised that Ireland’s “diaspora” 
was not static. Under the heading “Evolving Diaspora Policy”, the govern-
ment declared that it would encourage research and implement policy in line 
with the changing character and needs of Irish communities abroad (5, 17, 
52). As a subset of this policy, it would launch “an alumni challenge fund to 
provide seed-funding to new collaborative initiatives by Irish institutions to 
target their Irish and non-Irish graduates working internationally” (5, 53). The 
report also recognised the substantial number of immigrants who had come 
to Ireland in recent years, their contributions to local communities, and the 
new networks of migration and diaspora opened up by their presence (5, 52).
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5. Conclusion
Of the three elements of the idea of diaspora, relocation and connectiv-
ity have been uppermost in the Irish case, with their relative weight varying 
over time, while return has been of much less importance. Reverse migration 
from the United States to Ireland was more significant than historians have 
realised and it had a considerable impact on Irish rural history (Fitzpatrick 
2019). But it was on nowhere near the scale of Italian return, which reached 
rates as high as almost 50 percent from New York City and Buenos Aires at 
the turn of the twentieth century (Gabaccia 2000, 72-73). In the absence of 
reverse migration, however, connectivity contains within itself an element of 
return – not literal or physical, but emotional, cultural, or political. To forge 
connections with Ireland or with other Irish communities abroad is to partake 
in the creation and maintenance of something akin to a transnational Irish 
nation – in other words, the idea of a diaspora – that does not entail living 
in Ireland as a sine qua non of Irishness. The Irish nation, as the Global Irish 
report put it, “includes all those who feel a bind to Ireland” (DFA 2015, 11). 
With emigration from Ireland to the United States reduced to a trickle 
today compared to the Famine generation, Smyth (2018) has raised important 
questions about whether, and in what form, Irish American associational life 
can survive. While the content of Irish-American ethnicity has changed in 
the generation since the 1980s – from nationalist politics to culture, to put 
the matter in shorthand – he finds that its vitality has not diminished. The 
current and emerging sense of Irishness in the United States, far from being 
simply a diluted version of the old, is more “inclusive and confident” (Smyth 
2018, 16, 69) and for that reason it is likely to endure. But for how long, and 
in what form, remains an open question. Irish America today, as Smyth ob-
serves, lacks a single animating political issue comparable to its engagement 
with the Northern Ireland conflict in the 1980s. And the lack of replenish-
ment through immigration raises the spectre of symbolic ethnicity. Yet con-
nectivity can survive in the absence of immigration, providing a powerful 
force of economic, cultural, and political cohesion.
This article has demonstrated how the Irish created an idea of a diaspora 
in two quite different periods, under two distinct sets of circumstances. Out 
of the trauma and upheaval of the Famine years, emigrants built regional 
and local communities abroad, sustained by a common sense of exile, which 
eventually formed connections between themselves as well as with Ireland. 
The Irish idea of diaspora in this period emerged from the bottom up and it 
had a strong political dimension in the form of nationalism. In the contem-
porary era, with Ireland and the overseas communities connected in an in-
teractive global network, diaspora also has a strong political dimension but 
the Irish government has emerged as the central player. “A diaspora policy 
will not create or define the diaspora”, the Global Irish report states. “What it 
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can do is contribute to the activation and mobilisation of the Irish overseas, 
and further a sense that they are part of a community” (DFA 2015, 11). Yet 
this assertion, born of a tactful desire to be been seen as facilitating rather 
than directing the activities of the overseas Irish, does justice neither to the 
extent of governmental power nor to the idea of diaspora. Everyone who us-
es this idea helps shape its meaning – and no-one more so, in the contem-
porary era, than national governments that reach out to engage with their 
overseas populations.
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